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Abstract
We study the migration policy set by a welfare maximizing government in a model
where immigrant workers di®er in their skills and are imperfectly matched with het-
erogenous occupations. The policy ¯xes a minimum skill level for legal migrants, and
foreign workers that fall below it can only enter the country illegally. We start by
analyzing under which conditions an amnesty is desirable compared to tolerating un-
documented immigrants. Next, we study when it is preferable to have ex-ante lax
enforcement, rather than to carry out costly enforcement. We show that three chan-
nels play an important role in this decision: an amnesty is more likely the larger are
the output gains brought about by the legalization, the less redistributive is the welfare
state and the higher is the expected cost of criminal activities carried out by illegal
immigrants. Importantly, we also ¯nd that, when an amnesty is desirable, the destina-
tion country would reach an even higher welfare level investing in enforcement ex-ante.
Empirical evidence based on a novel panel dataset of legalization programs carried out
by a group of OECD countries between 1980-2007 broadly supports the role played by
the channels identi¯ed in our theoretical model.
JEL classi¯cation: F22, J61.
Keywords: Illegal immigration, Immigration Policy, Amnesties.
¤This paper is produced as part of the CEPR project \Temporary Migration, Integration and the role
of Policies" (TEMPO) funded by the NORFACE Research Programme: \Migration in Europe - Social,
Economic, Cultural and Policy Dynamics." We wish to thank for their comments and suggestions Peter
Egger, Tim Hatton, Assaf Razin and seminar participants at the NORFACE Migration conference in London
and at the CEPR Conference on the Economics and Politics of migration in Turin, Italy.
yUniversitµ a Bocconi, CES-Ifo, Econpubblica and LdA; email: alessandra.casarico@unibocconi.it
zErasmus University Rotterdam, Universita' degli Studi di Milano, CEPR, CES-Ifo, CReAM, IZA and
LdA; facchini@ese.eur.nl.
xUniversita' degli Studi di Milano, CReAM, IZA, and LdA; tommaso.frattini@unimi.it.
11 Introduction
Growing migration pressures in the presence of restrictive immigration policies have lead
to the emergence of illegal immigration as a widespread phenomenon, and most rich desti-
nation countries harbor today large populations of undocumented foreigners. Yet, there is
substantial heterogeneity in terms of both the stocks (and °ows) of illegal migrants, and the
policies which are adopted to handle illegal immigrants once they are in the country. Table
1, based on Fasani (2009) and our own calculations, provides information on a selected group
of destination countries.
As it can be seen, in 2008 the US hosted 12 millions illegals, representing one third of
the total foreign born population. In the other countries included in the table, the absolute
levels are much smaller, but illegal immigrants still represent an important fraction of total
immigrants. For instance, in 2007 almost one of two foreigners in Greece was without
proper documents, and in Italy the same situation held in 2008 for more than one out ¯ve
immigrants.
The legal status of migrants clearly re°ects the policy stance of the destination country,
both in terms of the ex{ante controls introduced to discipline the °ows, and the ex{post
measures taken to grant legal status to existing illegal immigrants. Amnesties have been the
focus of much attention, and much controversy. From Table 1 we can see that some countries
have never resorted to general amnesties (e.g. Germany and the United Kingdom), whereas
some others have made it a very frequently used instrument. For instance, this has been the
case of Spain, which has introduced six times a broad legalization program between 1980 and
2008. This of course has a direct impact on the estimated stocks of illegals, which is greatly
reduced right after a legalization. For instance, the 1986 amnesty introduced in the U.S.
with the IRCA lead to approximately 3.5 million legalizations (Facchini and Testa 2010),
and Dolado (2007) has convincingly argued that in the case of Spain during the nineties,
about 98% of the legal foreign residents had been illegally living in the country at some
point.
The purpose of this paper is to develop and empirically assess a general model of legal
and illegal immigration, which can help us understanding the basic tradeo®s faced by a
government between a costly enforcement of the o±cial target, and a lax enforcement ex{
ante, combined with an ex{post legalization program. To that end, we consider a two{period
setting, in which heterogeneous domestic ¯rms and foreign workers are randomly matched.
The quality of the match is higher for legal than for illegal immigrants, and illegal immigrants
might end up being involved in criminal activities. A redistributive welfare state is in place,
2which for simplicity covers only agents in the formal sector. In the ¯rst period, the destination
country government sets its o±cial migration policy which involves the determination of a
minimum skill requirement. Immigration then takes place, and foreign workers enter the
destination country's labor market. In the second period, immigration no longer occurs.
We analyze the setting of the policy under three di®erent scenarios. We start by con-
sidering the case in which migration policy enforcement is costless and the government can
implement its minimum skill requirement by simply announcing it. This will serve as a
useful benchmark for our subsequent discussion. In the second environment, implementing
the desired policy is costly, but the enforcement activity is underfunded. The result is that
illegal immigration can emerge in equilibrium. In this case, at the beginning of the second
period, the government decides whether to introduce an amnesty program to legalize un-
documented migrants or not. In the third scenario, the government uses instead a costly
enforcement technology which allows it to obtain the desired minimum skill level in the
immigrant population, and illegal immigration does not occur.
We show that an amnesty is more likely to be desirable the bigger is the gain to the
natives' aggregate income brought about by an improvement in the labor market matching
technology following a legalization, and the higher is the expected cost of criminal activities.
On the contrary, a redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable, as it entitles
low{skilled foreign workers to welfare state bene¯ts. Importantly, we ¯nd that, when an
amnesty is preferable to tolerating illegal migrants, the destination country would enjoy a
higher level of welfare investing ex{ante in migration policy enforcement. Thus, the labor
market matching technology, the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state and
the degree of involvement in criminal activities by illegal immigrants can inform a government
on the desirability of investing resources to control migration °ows. On the other hand, when
an amnesty is not desirable, the destination country might be better o® by not devoting any
resource to policy enforcement and by letting some foreign workers enter and stay illegally.
To assess the relevance of our theoretical model, we construct a novel panel dataset cover-
ing a large group of OECD countries over the period 1980-2007, and study the determinants
of the introduction of immigration amnesties. We match the time of the introduction of a
general legalization program with a wealth of characteristics of the country, that capture the
working of the channels identi¯ed in our model. We proxy for the role of the labor market
matching technology using a micro{based measure of the dispersion of educational attain-
ment by occupation within each country. The extent of redistribution carried out by the
welfare state is captured by social transfers, whereas the involvement of illegal immigrants
3in criminal activities is proxied by the incidence of crime in a given country. Furthermore,
we include a set of additional drivers that might in°uence the introduction of a legalization
program. In particular, we control for the business cycle dynamics and the demographic
structure in the immigrant destination country, for the pressure exercised by asylum seek-
ers and for the ideological orientation of the government. We ¯nd broad support for the
role played by the labor market matching and the welfare state channels in shaping the
probability of an amnesty. This result is robust to alternative de¯nitions of our key control
variables.
This paper contributes to the small but growing literature on immigration amnesties.
Chau (2001) shows that granting an amnesty to illegal workers can be part of an optimal
migration policy package { together with internal and border controls | when there is a
time inconsistency problem because the government cannot commit to implement the ex-
ante optimal frequency of internal controls. Importantly, in her model all workers share
the same skill level and immigrants are ex{ante all undocumented. They can become legal
only as a result of an amnesty. In our model, besides considering heterogeneous workers and
¯rms, we explicitly solve instead for the optimal migration policy of the destination country's
government. This policy involves setting a minimum skill requirement for legal immigrants
and as a result, it endogenizes the presence of illegal immigrants as those individuals whose
skill level falls below the critical threshold chosen by the government.1
Karlson and Katz (2003) consider instead the role of amnesties as a tool for governments
to induce immigrants to self{select based on ability. Similarly to our model, they also
consider migrants that di®er in their skill level, and emphasize that an amnesty will o®er
better labor market opportunities to more skilled workers. As a result, the latter might be
enticed to migrate even as illegals, in the hope that an ex{post legalization will improve
their income opportunities. Di®erently from us, in Karlson and Katz's (2003) model and in
their companion paper (Karlson and Katz 2010) legal immigration is not explicitly modeled
together with illegal immigration.
Epstein and Weiss (2011) also study the desirability of legalization programs. In their
setting, immigrants can only enter the country illegally, and can become legal as a result
of an amnesty. Immigration is always costly from the destination country's point of view,
both when the migrants are illegal, as well as when they are ex{post legalized. Such cost
depends only on the total number of immigrants, and not on their skill level. Moreover,
the legalization program does not a®ect the labor market opportunities of the legalized
1Alternatively, the illegal status could be the result of an o±cial quota which has been exceeded, as in
the case of Facchini and Testa (2010).
4migrant in the sense that he continues to earn the same wage before and after the amnesty.
Empirical evidence has instead pointed out that labor market outcomes of legalized migrants
do improve following an amnesty (Kossoudji and Cobb{Clark 2002). More generally, the skill
level of the illegal migrant is likely to be a key determinant of the welfare consequences of a
legalization program, and modeling this is at the heart of our analysis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic setup,
whereas section 3 introduces the three policy setting scenarios. Section 4 characterizes the
optimal policy. Section 5 describes the data we have used and section 37 develops our
empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 The model
To analyze the optimal choice of migration policy, we develop a two{period model. In
the ¯rst period the destination country government sets its o±cial migration policy which
involves the determination of a minimum skill requirement. Immigration then takes place,
and foreign workers enter the destination country's labor market. In the second period,
immigration no longer occurs.
We analyze the setting of the policy under three di®erent scenarios. In the benchmark
setup, enforcement2 is costless and the government can implement its minimum skill require-
ment by simply announcing it. In the second environment, implementing the desired policy is
costly, but the enforcement activity is underfunded. The result is that illegal immigration can
emerge in equilibrium. In this case, at the beginning of the second period, the government
will decide whether to introduce an amnesty program to legalize undocumented migrants
or not. In the third scenario, the government uses instead a costly enforcement technology
which allows it to obtain the desired minimum skill level in the immigrant population and
no illegal immigration occurs.
For simplicity, we assume that agents do not discount the future. In what follows we start
by characterizing the destination country's economy, and introduce then the immigrants'
decision to leave.
2We do not explicitly distinguish between domestic and border enforcement, even if both tools might
play a role. In the U.S. for example, border enforcement is by far the most commonly used instrument. In
fact, as Hanson (2006) has argued, between 1992{2004 \...93 percent of deportable aliens were located by
the Border Patrol, rather than by ICE or INS agents in the U.S. interior."
52.1 The destination country
In each of the two periods, there is a set of I potentially active ¯rms in the host country,
each one of them indexed by i, with i distributed according to the density function n(i) on
the interval [0;1]. Firms can be ranked according to their skill intensity and we will assume
that a higher i indicates a higher skill requirement, with 1 being the most skill intensive
¯rm. The ¯rms active in the host country are owned by native individuals, and the mass of
the domestic population is given by N, where I ¸ N.
Potential immigrants di®er in their ability, and are indexed by j, with j distributed
according to the density function m(j) on the interval [0;1], with 1 being the highest skill
level. The number of immigrants in the destination country is given by M, and it will
be determined endogenously. The labor market in the host country is imperfect, in the
sense that individual abilities and a vacancy's skill requirement are not necessarily perfectly






[1 ¡ (j ¡ i)]v(j) if j ¸ i
0 if j < i
In other words, the value of the match is maximized if a vacancy of type j is occupied
by an individual with skill type j. At the same time, the value of the match is zero, if the
migrant's skill level is lower than the one required by the vacancy. Finally, if the individual
ends up in a job for which he is over{quali¯ed, then the value of the match is still positive,
but smaller than the one which could be achieved if i = j. Finally, since individual ability
increases with j, it is reasonable to assume that v(j) increases with j. The probability that
individual j is matched to vacancy i is described by the joint density function f(i;j).
Let ® be the share of the value of the match which is appropriated by each ¯rm's owner,
whereas (1 ¡ ®) is the share of the value of the match which goes to the immigrant worker.
With I potentially active ¯rms the average income of the ¯rm's owners { that is the natives









3See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
6whereas the average income of the immigrant is given by
Y







where jmin represents the minimum skill requirement which will be endogenously determined
in the model. Notice that jmin will di®er according to the scenarios we will be considering.
In the destination country there is a redistributive welfare state, characterized by a
proportional income tax ¿ and a lump{sum transfer b. All natives and legal immigrants
contribute to the welfare system and are entitled to receive its bene¯ts. To capture the
existence of a ¯scal leakage from the natives to the immigrants,4 we assume that the average







for any possible M. Notice that this assumption implies that on average natives will be
net contributors to the welfare state, whereas immigrants will be net receivers. At the same
time, it might well be that some natives end up on the receiving end of the welfare state,
whereas some migrants are net contributors to it.
2.2 The source country
The source country is populated by M individuals, each one of them characterized by a
skill level j. Let v be the reservation income the native earns in each period in the source
country, which for simplicity is assumed to be equal across citizens. The decision to migrate
is based on the comparison between the expected income in the destination country and
the reservation income in the source. Note that the former depends on the migration policy
enacted by the destination country's government. For this reason, we specify the details of
this decision after introducing the various policy regimes.
4See for instance Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002) and Facchini, Razin, and Willmann (2004).
73 The setting of migration policy
3.1 Costless enforcement
As a benchmark, we start from the case in which the destination country government can
carry out its optimal policy at no cost. In other words, in this scenario, the government
can implement the desired migration quota, without facing any enforcement cost. The
immigrants entering the country in this regime are legal and enjoy/contribute to the welfare
state as all natives do.
Consider now a migrant's decision to relocate. An individual with skill level j, will move
abroad if and only if
2[(1 ¡ ®)(1 ¡ ¿)
Z 1
0
v(i;j)f(i;j)di + bce] ¡ · ¸ 2v (4)
The term on the left hand side of the inequality captures the expected payo® of a potential
migrant over the two periods if he decides to relocate abroad, where · > 0 is an exogenously
given migration cost. The ¯rst term in square brackets captures the net expected income
appropriated by the migrant and bce is the lump{sum transfer he will receive from the
destination country's welfare state. Remember that if a migrant j is matched with a ¯rm
requiring a higher skill intensity, the value of the match is set equal to zero. The above
equation can be rewritten as follows:
v(j) ¸
v + ·=2 ¡ bce
(1 ¡ ¿)(1 ¡ ®)
nR 1
0 [1 ¡ (j ¡ i)]f(i;j)di
o (5)
Notice that the left hand side of equation 5 is increasing with j, whereas the right hand
side is decreasing. The latter is true because as an individual becomes more skilled, the set
of vacancies available to him strictly increases. Let jce be the individual which is indi®erent
between migrating and staying put. Then, all individuals for which j ¸ jce will prefer to
migrate, whereas all those individuals for which j < jce will stay behind.
As for the decision of the government, the policy will take the form of a minimum skill
requirement which will be imposed upon the immigrant. The skill requirement will be set
by maximizing the natives' aggregate welfare, which in our case is just aggregate income.5




0 v(i;j)f(i;j)didj which represents the total
5In this model we abstract from political economy considerations, that might a®ect the government's
objective function. For an example of a political economy model of illegal immigration, see Facchini and
Testa (2010).
8expected value created by legal migrants whose minimum skill level is given by j, and let
M(j;1) =
R 1
j m(j)dj be the total number of legal immigrants entering the country. Thus,
the objective function of the government is given by
W = 2[®(1 ¡ ¿)V (j;1) + bceN] (6)
where j is the minimum skill requirement to be determined through the welfare maximization
process. The government's budget is balanced in each period and is given by
¿V (j;1) = bce [N + M(j;1)] (7)
Maximizing 6 subject to 7, we obtain the following ¯rst order condition, which implicitly
de¯nes the skill requirement ^ j that maximizes the destination country's welfare:
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= ¡m(^ j) (9)







v(^ j)[1 ¡ (^ j ¡ 1)]f(i;j)di < 0 (10)
captures the change in aggregate income brought about by a marginal increase in the skill
level of the last migrant to be admitted in the country. The ¯rst term on the right hand
side of equation 8 represents the negative impact of an increase in the skill requirement on
the aggregate income and therefore on the tax base, whereas the second term represents the
positive e®ect of a more restrictive migration policy on the per capita bene¯ts brought about
by a reduction in the number of recipients.
It is interesting to study the e®ects of a change in the distribution of the surplus be-
tween natives and immigrants on the optimal number of immigrants to be admitted in the
destination country. This is done in the following:
Lemma 1 An increase in the share of output appropriated by the natives leads to a decrease
in the minimum skill level required to the migrant.









@® = (1 ¡ ¿)
@V (^ j;1)
@j < 0, and B^ j =
@B[:;^ j(:)]
@^ j < 0 from the assumption of
concavity of the objective function. Thus,
@^ j
@® < 0.
Similarly, we can also study the e®ect of an increase in the size of the welfare state on
the optimal migration policy. This is done in the following:
Lemma 2 An increase in ¿ leads to an increase in the minimum skill level required to the
migrant.
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem, the e®ect of an increase in ¿ on the optimal


















@j > 0 if ®
1¡® > N
M(^ j;1) as assumed
above. Thus, recalling that the objective function is concave, the result follows immediately.
Notice that, for the problem to be interesting, the government's policy needs to be bind-
ing, that is ^ j > jce, i.e. the minimum skill requirement by the destination country must
be higher than the minimum skill level of the marginal foreign worker, who is interested in
moving abroad. We will retain this assumption throughout the remainder of the paper.
3.2 Underfunded government
We turn now to examine an alternative scenario, where implementing a restrictive migration
policy is costly, but the government does not have a budget at its disposal to this end. In
the ¯rst period, the policy maker announces a minimum skill requirement j¤, knowing that
in the absence of a su±cient enforcement budget, it might see workers of lower skill levels
settling in the country as illegals.6 Such migrants can work in the formal sector. If they do
6In fact, in the recent debate on how to curb illegal immigration in the U.S., much emphasis has been
placed on increasing funding for migration policy enforcement. This is for instance at the center of the
proposal by senator Reid, Durbin, Schumer, Feinstein, Leahy, and Menendez (2010). Besides this channel,
the literature has also emphasized the role played by shocks in the immigrant supply as a driver of illegal
10so, the probability that individual j is matched to vacancy i is described by the joint density
function g(i;j). Alternatively, they can engage in criminal activities. In either case, they
will neither contribute nor have access to the welfare state in the destination country.7 To
simplify the analysis, we assume that the selection into the sector of employment is random,
i.e. with probability h an illegal immigrant will end up working in the formal sector, whereas
with probability (1 ¡ h) he will end up working in the criminal sector.
In the second period, if undocumented migrants are present in the country, the govern-
ment can decide whether to grant an amnesty, or continue to keep them as illegals.8 Granting
an amnesty leads to an improvement in the labor market matching of the previously illegal
workers and to their full involvement in the welfare state.
For all those foreign born individuals characterized by a skill level j < j¤, the only
possible option is to enter the country illegally. However, when deciding whether to migrate
or not, the migrant assigns a subjective probability q to the event that in the second period
the host country government will not grant an amnesty, and correspondingly (1 ¡ q) to the
event that it will actually do so. Thus, we can write the condition determining whether an
individual j < j¤ decides to migrate illegally or not as follows

















where v0 denotes the income from engaging in criminal activities. By assumption this does
not depend upon the skill pro¯le of the worker and furthermore we maintain that there is
no minimum skill required to engage in such activities. We also assume that natives in the
destination country can appropriate a share ® of the income generated by these activities,
whereas the migrants will receive the share (1 ¡ ®) { i.e. the same sharing rule applies as
for the formal sector.
To capture the more limited search opportunities available to an illegal immigrant than to
a legal one we focus on the case in which (1¡®)
R 1
0 v(i;j)f(i;j)di ¸ (1¡®)
R 1
0 v(i;j)g(i;j)di,
for all j 2 [0;1] i.e. the expected income of working in the formal sector legally is higher
immigration when the government sets its o±cial policy before the occurrence of the shock. See Facchini
and Testa (2010).
7Of course this is a simplifying assumption, but it has been argued that legal and illegal migrants di®er
in their net position towards the welfare state. See for instance Camarota (2004).
8We are abstracting from considering the deportation of illegal immigrants. This is of course a relevant
policy option, but in the context of our model, since illegal immigration is brought about by the lack of
funds to carry out policy enforcement, we assume away the possibility of implementing costly deportations.
11than the expected income of working in the formal sector as an illegal.9 Finally, to make our
problem interesting, we will also assume that the total expected income of a legal immigrant




v(i;j)f(i;j)di + bl > h
Z 1
0
v(i;j)g(i;j)di + (1 ¡ h)v
0
Equation 13 can be rewritten as
v(j) ¸




0 [1 ¡ (j ¡ i)]g(i;j)di + (1 ¡ q)(1 ¡ ¿)
R 1
0 [1 ¡ (j ¡ i)]f(i;j)di
o
(1 ¡ ®)
which leads to the identi¯cation of the threshold skill level jill such that a migrant will
¯nd it desirable to migrate as an illegal. Applying the same argument as for equation 5, it
follows immediately that any individual with a skill level j ¸ jill will also ¯nd it desirable
to migrate. Recall that all individuals with j > j¤ will enter the country legally. Notice
also that a more open o±cial migration policy will not a®ect the incentives of the marginal
individual to migrate illegally, as long as jill < j¤. This is because the marginal illegal
immigrant jill does not have access to occupations characterized by a skill intensity level
j ¸ jill. Let M(jill;j¤) =
R j¤
jill m(j)dj be the number of illegal migrants entering the country.
Notice also that, from equation 13, we have that an increase in the probability of legal-
ization in the second period leads to an increase in the number of illegal immigrants entering
in the ¯rst period M(jill;j¤) by reducing the minimum skill threshold jill to ¯nd it optimal
to emigrate.10
In order to determine the skill requirement chosen by an underfunded government, we
need to maximize the following welfare function with respect to j:
Wun = (1 + ´)
£




+ (1 ¡ ´)
£







0 v(i;j)g(i;j)didj indicates the total expected value created by illegal
migrants with skill levels comprised between jill and j and ´ > 0 is the likelihood that the
government will not carry out an amnesty in the second period. The ¯rst row represents
the destination country's expected welfare over the two periods when both legal and illegal
9See for instance Rivera Batiz (1999) and Kossoudji and Cobb{Clark (2002) for studies of the e®ect of
legal status on immigrant wages.
10This is true as long as the e®ect of a change in q on the second period bene¯t has a second order impact
on the immigrant's well being.
12migration take place and no amnesty is granted with probability ´. The ¯rst term in square
brackets is the net aggregate income appropriated by natives when the o±cial migration
policy sets a minimum threshold j. The second term represents the welfare transfer to the
natives when the government is underfunded and illegal immigrants do not have access to





The third term captures the native's share of the expected income generated by illegal im-
migrants working in the informal sector, whereas the fourth represents the expected net cost
to the natives from illegal immigrants engaged in criminal activities, with x > 0 indicating
the social burden induced by those activities. The second row captures instead the expected
welfare in the second period when an amnesty takes place with probability 1 ¡ ´. The ¯rst
term captures the net aggregate income appropriated by natives when undocumented mi-
grants have been legalized and the second term captures the welfare transfers to the natives





Notice that if an amnesty takes place all immigrants are fully engaged in the welfare state
and thus pay taxes and receive bene¯ts. As a result, bun > bl.
The ¯rst order condition corresponding to the maximization of equation 14 is given by
Bun[:;j




















g = 0 (17)
Equation 17 implicitly de¯nes j¤.
3.3 Costly enforcement
We now turn to an alternative scenario, in which the government uses the revenues raised
not only to ¯nance the welfare bene¯t, but also to carry out an enforcement policy. The cost
of implementing this policy is given by c(j), which is an increasing function of the minimum
skill level required to the migrant. Throughout this section, as we have already done in our
previous analysis, we assume that the minimum skill requirement introduced by the costly
13migration policy is binding, i.e. there are more workers willing to come than those o±cially
admitted. For this reason we do not explicitly model once again the migration choice of the
natives in the sending country. The government's objective function thus becomes
Wc = 2®(1 ¡ ¿)V (j;1) + (bc + b)N (18)
where the ¯rst term on the right hand side has the same interpretation as in equation 14,
and bc and b are respectively the demogrant paid in period 1, when a costly enforcement is
carried out, and in period 2, when no further migration °ows take place and therefore no
enforcement is needed. Formally, they are de¯ned by the following budget constraints:
bc =







Maximizing 18 subject to equations 19 and 20, we obtain the following ¯rst order condi-
tion which implicitly de¯nes the skill requirement ~ j that maximizes the destination country's
welfare:
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¿N











N + M(~ j;1)
+
Nc(~ j)




3.4 The optimal minimum skill requirement across regimes
We turn now to compare the minimum skill requirements chosen under the three di®erent
regimes we have considered so far. We start by comparing ^ j and ~ j, i.e. the ability threshold
levels chosen respectively under costless and costly enforcement. This is done in the following
Lemma 3 The minimum ability level ^ j chosen by the government under the costless enforce-
ment regime is higher than the minimum ability level ~ j chosen under the costly enforcement
one.
Proof. Combining equations 8 with 21, it follows immediately that equation 21 evaluated
at ^ j is negative. Since Wun is concave, ~ j < ^ j.
The intuition for this result is that the presence of a migration policy enforcement cost
leads to a decrease in the minimum skill level chosen by the government, i.e. to a less
14-
~ j ^ j j¤
Figure 1: Minimum skill thresholds
restrictive migration policy. We can now compare the minimum skill requirement under
costless enforcement and in the presence of an underfunded regime.
Lemma 4 The minimum ability level j¤ chosen by an underfunded government is greater or
equal to the minimum ability level ^ j chosen under costless enforcement as long as ®h
@V (jill;^ j)
@j ¸
(1 ¡ h)(x ¡ ®v0)
@M(jill;^ j)
@j .
Proof. To carry out the comparison, we evaluate equation 17 at j = ^ j. Given that ^ j satis¯es
equation 8 with equality, equation 17 simpli¯es to
Bun[:;^ j(:)] = ®h
@V (jill;^ j)
@j









@j . Since Wun is concave, j¤ > ^ j.
Thus, if the marginal contribution of an illegal immigrant to expected domestic income at
^ j is greater than the expected cost of his criminal activities, the minimum skill requirement
is at least as restrictive in the presence of an underfunded government as it is with costless
enforcement. Summarizing our results, the following ordering emerges
~ j < ^ j < j
¤ (23)
This is illustrated in Figure 1.
4 Choosing the optimal migration policy
In this section, we determine the optimal migration policy for the destination country, by
solving the government's problem which is illustrated in Figure 2. We start by comparing the
levels of welfare which can be obtained by a government, which has introduced a minimum
skill requirement, but has not devoted any resource to its enforcement. In this case illegal







Figure 2: The government's decision problem
to legalize all illegal immigrants present in the country or to keep them in the informal
economy. Next, we will compare the outcomes resulting from the choices of an underfunded
government, with the costly enforcement option, in which the immigration authorities set
an o±cial policy ex{ante and invest resources to perfectly enforce it.
4.1 When is an amnesty desirable?
To decide whether to carry out an amnesty, the government compares aggregate welfare
when undocumented migrants are kept illegal, i.e.
Wun(´ = 1) = 2
£
®(1 ¡ ¿)V (j
¤;1) + bunN + ®hV (jill;j





to the welfare obtained by carrying out the legalization program, i.e.
Wun(´ = 0) =
£





®(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;1) + blN
¤
(25)
16Subtracting equation 24 from equation 25 we obtain the following expression:
Wun(´ = 0) ¡ Wun(´ = 1) = ®
£
V (jill;j




+ N(bl ¡ bun) ¡ ¿V (jill;j
¤) + (1 ¡ h)(x ¡ ®v
0)M(jill;j
¤)
Equation 26 allows us to highlight three channels which shape the likelihood of carrying out
a legalization program. The ¯rst is the labor market matching channel: the bigger is the
gain to aggregate income induced by a better labor market matching process, the higher is
the likelihood that a legalization will be carried out (see the ¯rst term on the right hand
side). The second is the welfare state channel (see the second and third term on the right
hand side). Recalling that bl < bun this channel suggests that a legalization is not desirable.
Notice also that












In other words, a more redistributive welfare state will make an amnesty even less desirable,
as it makes the welfare leakage to the migrants more severe. The third channel is represented
by the expected social cost of criminal activities. The bigger is the net cost of crime, the
more likely will be an amnesty.
4.2 When should migration be restricted?
Let us start by assuming that Wun(´ = 0) ¡ Wun(´ = 1) > 0, that is, a legalization is
desirable whenever a government's migration policy is underfunded. We want to determine
under which conditions the well being of natives is higher when the government carries out a
costly enforcement strategy, rather than allowing undocumented immigrants in the country
and then legalizing them.
This is done in the following
Proposition 1 If Wun(´ = 0) ¡ Wun(´ = 1) > 0, then Wc > Wun(´ = 0), that is costly
enforcement is always preferable to an ex-post legalization.
Proof. Subtract equation 25 evaluated at j¤ from equation 18 evaluated at ~ j. After a few
manipulations, we obtain
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 0) = ®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (~ j;j
¤) ¡ hV (~ j;j
¤)
¤
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17To sign the left hand side of equation 28, we use our assumption that Wun(´ = 0)¡Wun(´ =
1) > 0. This is equivalent to assume that
®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (~ j;j¤) ¡ hV (~ j;j¤)
¤
+ (1 ¡ h)[(x ¡ ®v0)M(jill;j¤)] >
¡®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡ hV (jill;~ j)
¤
¡ N(bl ¡ bun) (29)
We use the inequality in equation 29, to rewrite equation 28 as follows
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 0) > ¡®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡ hV (jill;~ j)
¤
¡ N(bl ¡ bun) +
¡ ®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) + hV (jill;~ j)
¤
+ (bc ¡ bun + b ¡ bl)N (30)
This is equivalent to
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 0) > N(bc + b ¡ 2bl) ¡ 2®(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) (31)
Let the term on the right hand side of equation 31 be denoted by A . This can be expressed
also as
A = 2N(b ¡ bl) ¡ 2®(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡
c(~ j)N
N + M(~ j;1)
(32)
The ¯rst term captures the gain in the per capita bene¯t arising from restricting immigration
using costly enforcement compared to allowing all potential immigrants up to jill to enter the
destination country legally, and thus giving them access to the welfare state. The second term
represents the net income loss for natives due to the restriction in the in°ow of immigrants.
The third is the direct cost of limiting the in°ow of foreign workers in the ¯rst period.
Alternatively, A can be thought of as the di®erence between the welfare in the destination
country when a restrictive policy is implemented and that when no enforcement cost is
incurred and all immigrants up to jill are admitted as legals. Under our assumption that the
government's welfare maximization in the presence of costly enforcement admits an interior
solution, A > 0 as the government's objective is maximized at ~ j rather than at jill.
Let us now turn to the case where Wun(´ = 0) ¡ Wun(´ = 1) < 0, that is, whenever the
government is underfunded, it is desirable to keep the undocumented immigrants as illegal.
We are still interested in studying whether carrying out a costly enforcement strategy in
the ¯rst period is preferable to allowing illegal immigrants to remain. This is done in the
following
Proposition 2 If Wun(´ = 0) ¡ Wun(´ = 1) < 0, then the comparison between the level of
18welfare achievable under a costly enforcement regime and that achievable when undocumented
immigrants are kept illegal is ambiguous.
Proof. Subtract equation 24 evaluated at j¤ from equation 18 evaluated at ~ j. After a few
manipulations we obtain
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 1) = 2®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (~ j;j
¤) ¡ hV (~ j;j
¤)
¤
+ 2(1 ¡ h)[(x ¡ ®v
0)M(jill;j
¤)] +
¡ 2®hV (jill;~ j) + (bc ¡ 2bun + b)N (33)
To sign the left hand side of equation 33, we use our assumption that Wun(´ = 0) ¡
Wun(´ = 1) < 0. This is equivalent to assume that
®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (~ j;j¤) ¡ hV (~ j;j¤)
¤
+ (1 ¡ h)[(x ¡ ®v0)M(jill;j¤)] <
¡®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡ hV (jill;~ j)
¤
¡ N(bl ¡ bun) (34)
We use the inequality in equation 34, to rewrite equation 33 as follows
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 1) < ¡®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡ hV (jill;~ j)
¤
¡ N(bl ¡ bun) +
¡ ®
£
(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) + hV (jill;~ j)
¤
+ (bc ¡ bun + b ¡ bl)N (35)
This can be expressed as
Wc ¡ Wun(´ = 1) < 2N(b ¡ bl) ¡ 2®(1 ¡ ¿)V (jill;~ j) ¡
c(~ j)N
N + M(~ j;1)
= A (36)
As we have argued above, A > 0, and thus Wc R Wun(´ = 1).
Summarizing, we have shown that an amnesty is more likely to be desirable the bigger
is the gain to aggregate income brought about by an improvement in the labor market
matching technology following a legalization, and the higher is the expected cost of criminal
activities. On the contrary, a redistributive welfare state makes an amnesty less desirable,
as it entitles low{skilled foreign workers to welfare state bene¯ts. Importantly, we ¯nd that,
when an amnesty is preferable to tolerating illegal migrants, the destination country would
enjoy a higher level of welfare investing ex{ante in migration policy enforcement. Thus, the
labor market matching technology, the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare
state and the degree of involvement in criminal activities by illegal immigrants can inform
a government on the desirability of investing resources to control migration °ows. On the
19other hand, when an amnesty is not desirable, the destination country might be better o® by
not devoting any resource to policy enforcement and by letting some foreign workers enter
and stay illegally. We next investigate the role of these three channels in explaining the
likelihood of the introduction of a legalization program.
5 Data
To assess the role played by the labor market channel, the welfare state channel and the social
cost of criminal activities in shaping the incentives to carry out an amnesty, we construct a
novel dataset covering 17 OECD countries11 spanning the period 1980-2007. In this section
we describe the variables we have used in our analysis.
5.1 Amnesties
For each of the countries in our sample we have started by collecting information on immi-
grants' legalization programs (amnesties). We de¯ne an amnesty as a procedure that allows
immigrants who are already in the country of destination in violation of its immigration law
(i.e. undocumented immigrants) to obtain a legal residence and work permit. To qualify as
an amnesty, a regularization program must also satisfy the following requisites: a) it does
not form part of the regular migration policy framework; b) it runs for a limited period of
time; c) it is not speci¯c to certain categories of immigrants alone. Note that a legalization
program may well be conditional on some individual characteristics: typically, a minimum
period of residence in the country of destination is required and/or having a job.
Our main sources of information are the annual reports of the OECD Continuous Re-
porting System on Migration, now known as the OECD International Migration Outlook
(SOPEMI 2011). These reports contain detailed country notes on developments in migra-
tion policy in member states that are compiled annually by country experts. We cross-
check and supplement that information with the Final Report and Appendices A and B
of the European Commission-funded Regularizations in the European Union (REGINE) re-
search program, conducted by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development12
(Baldwin{Edwards and Kraler 2009). The REGINE report provides information on immi-
grant regularization practices in the EU member states as well as in Switzerland and the
11We include: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the UK, and the US.
12http//www.icmpd.org.
20United States.
The REGINE project identi¯es ¯ve additional legalization episodes, that are not men-
tioned in the SOPEMI reports. Furthermore, in up to three instances we do not have enough
information to determine whether a regularization satis¯es all the criteria set out above to
be considered a general amnesty. In our empirical speci¯cation we check the robustness of
our results to the source of our information and to the exclusion of those legalizations whose
nature is ambiguous. As a result, in our benchmark speci¯cation, we use Amnesty 1, which
records all amnesties listed in SOPEMI. In addition, we also use Amnesty 2, which includes
all programs listed in REGINE or SOPEMI, Amnesty 3, which excludes from the SOPEMI
list the ambiguous cases and Amnesty 4 which excludes from the REGINE or SOPEMI list
the ambiguous cases.
In Table 2 we report for each country the sample period covered in our analysis, and the
years in which we observe an amnesty. We provide a detailed description of the amnesties
included in our study in table A1.
5.2 Mismatch in the labor market
Our model highlights the role played by a legalization on the quality of the labor market
match for migrants. Ideally, we would like to be able to construct a measure for both legal and
illegal migrants. Unfortunately, standard sources cover only small samples of immigrants.
Furthermore, no information is available on the legal status of foreign workers and as a result,
we will need to use a proxy for this important driving force.
We build an index measuring the quality of the match between workers' quali¯cations
and their occupations. To that end we consider the distribution of educational attainment
for each occupation. Employees who depart from a centrality index by at least one standard
deviation are classi¯ed as either over{ or under{educated. We then base our index of the
extent of mismatch on the share of workers that are under- or over- educated (for a discussion
of this type of indices see e.g. Chevalier 2003, Verdugo and Verdugo 1988, Mendes de Oliveira,
Santos, and Kiker 2000 and Hartog 2000).
We construct these indicators for every country using annual microdata (Labor Force
Surveys for most European countries and Canada, and the March extract of the Current
Population Survey for the US). For European countries from 1998 onwards we use the Eu-
ropean Union Labor Force Survey (EULFS), which provides a homogeneous source of in-
formation. The EULFS does not contain data on educational quali¯cations in any country
before 1998, so we have to rely on country-speci¯c data for earlier years, where available. We
21provide details on the source of the data used in every year and country in the Appendix. We
proceed as follows. First, we transform the variable on educational quali¯cation into years
of education, using UNESCO conversion tables or experts' evaluations. Second, we compute
for every sub-major occupation group (two{digit ISCO88 categories or equivalent) the mode,
median and standard deviation of years of education. Third, for each occupation group we
calculate the percentage of workers with a level of education that is more than one standard
deviation above or below the mode (median). Fourth, we compute the (weighted) average
across all occupations of the above indices to have two alternative country-wide measures
of job market educational mismatch. Our preferred index is based on deviations from the
mode. The mode is less sensitive to the presence of outliers in the data and seems therefore
more appropriate as a centrality measure for a discrete distribution (like that of educational
quali¯cations).13 We check the robustness of our results to the choice of the median as an
alternative measure.
5.3 Social expenditure
We proxy the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state with public expendi-
ture on unemployment bene¯ts as a share of GDP, taken from the OECD Social Expenditure
Database for all years 1980-2007. As Boeri, Hanson, and McCormick (2002) show, unem-
ployment bene¯ts are one of the transfer programs that are used most by immigrants. We
also check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of broader measures of public expen-
diture encompassing also family bene¯ts as a share of GDP, and housing expenditure as a
share of GDP, as both these programs are disproportionately used by immigrants (see also
Boeri 2010).
5.4 Crime data
In our theoretical analysis, a legalization has the e®ect of reducing the incidence of crime
among migrants. To exactly capture the working of this channel, we would need data on the
incidence of crime by the legal status of the perpetrator. Unfortunately, this information is
not consistently available for all the countries and years included in our study. As a result
we had to limit ourselves to broad measures of criminal activities, which do not allow a
breakdown based on the nationality of the o®ender. Our working hypothesis is that the
crime rate among illegal immigrants is higher in countries where the overall crime rate is
13See also Mendes de Oliveira, Santos, and Kiker (2000) for a discussion.
22higher. In particular, we have collected information using waves 2 to 11 of the United Nations
Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN{CTS),14 and
supplemented it with information taken from the four editions of the European Sourcebook
on Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (ESCCJS, see Killias et al. 2010). Data for the
UN{CTS are collected through questionnaires sent by the United Nations O±ce on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC) to all member states, which are asked to report information on the
incidence of police-reported crime and on the operation of criminal justice systems in every
country. The ESCCJS is a data collection initiative that started in 1993 under the umbrella
of the Council of Europe which contains, among other things, data on crime reported to
the police for European countries for the years 1990-2007. Data are collected through a
network of national correspondents who base their reports on a plurality of national and
international data sources. Importantly, at each new edition, data from past years are
validated and updated (see Killias et al. (2010) for details).
Our ¯nal variables express each type of crime as a rate per 100 thousand people. Our
preferred indicator is the number of robberies, as this is the series with the fewest missing
values. We check the robustness of our results using alternative measures where we both
interpolate and extrapolate missing observations. In particular, we use data on intentional
homicides, thefts and rapes reported to the authorities.
5.5 Further controls
In all our regressions we include a number of additional variables that might be correlated
with the probability of having an amnesty. First, we are concerned that the stock and °ows
of illegal immigrants might be an important driver of a government's decision to undertake
a legalization. As noticed before, no reliable estimates exist of the number of these ¯gures
over time and across countries. For this reason, we have decided to proxy the °ow of illegal
immigrants with the number of applications for asylum in every year. We believe this to be
a reasonable strategy, as in many Western destination countries popular opinion tends to
identify asylum seekers with illegal immigrants (see Hatton 2011).15 We obtain data on the
annual number of asylum applications by country from the UNHCR Statistical Database, and
normalize them by the size (in thousand) of the country population, retrieved from the 2010
revision of the World Population Prospects prepared by the Population Division, Department
14www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-
Operations-of-Criminal-Justice-Systems.html
15There is also some direct evidence suggesting that a large proportion of failed asylum seekers do simply
stay as illegals. See Hatton (2009).
23of Economic and Social A®airs of the United Nations. Additionally, we control for business
cycle dynamics in the receiving country by including the growth rate of the GDP per head,
expressed at constant prices and exchange rate, which we construct from the OECD National
Accounts. We also include the old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the ratio of people older than 64
to the working age (16-64) population, from the World Bank World Development Indicators
database, to capture the demographic characteristics of the receiving country. In particular
it has been argued that migration might be a tool to relieve the ¯nancial sustainability
problem of pay as you go social security systems in destination countries and as a result
we might expect that an aging population might increase the probability of an amnesty
that would allow young immigrants to contribute to the social security system. Finally, we
control for the political orientation of the government in each country. We use data from the
2010 edition of the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI)16 to construct an
indicator variable that takes a value of one if the main party in the government's coalition
is right{wing. Summary statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are reported in
Table A2 in the Appendix.
6 Empirical analysis
Our model has identi¯ed three channels that play a role in shaping the decision to introduce
an amnesty. Our predictions are that the larger is the improvement in the labor market
matching, the more likely is the introduction of a legalization program, as this increases
the natives' welfare. At the same time, the more redistributive is the welfare state, the
less likely is the introduction of the amnesty, as the ¯scal leakage to migrants becomes more
severe. Finally, the more likely it is that an illegal immigrant is involved in criminal activities
(compared to legals), the higher is the probability of a legalization.
As we have already mentioned, we cannot directly capture the e®ect of the legalization
on the quality of the match for the migrants. Therefore we proxy for our key explanatory
variable with a mismatch index for the overall labor force. Assuming that a change in the
mismatch index for the entire labor force is positively correlated with that in the mismatch
index in the informal labor market, to establish a link between our theoretical model and
the index we construct, we need to consider two possible scenarios. On the one hand, if the
change in the mismatch index is larger for the informal sector than for the overall economy,
we expect a positive relationship between a change in our labor market mismatch index
16See Beck, Clarke, Gro®, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) for a description of this dataset.
24and the probability of a legalization. Alternatively, if the change is smaller for the informal
sector, this relationship is ambiguous.17 The sign of the relationship between our measure
of the quality of the match in the labor market and the likelihood of an amnesty is thus an
empirical question.
We estimate the following empirical model:





ct +Dt +Dc +uct (37)
where Act is a dummy variable indicating whether country c has implemented an amnesty
in year t, misct is the labor market mismatch index described in section 5.2, welfarect is the
measure of the size of the welfare state described in section 5.3, crimect is our crime measure
described in section 5.4, X is a vector of control variables which includes the number of
asylum applications, per capita GDP growth, the old age dependency ratio, and a dummy
for the government's political orientation, as described in section 5.5. eulfsct is a dummy
variable indicating whether the mismatch index is computed using EULFS data, unctsw
ct is
an indicator variable denoting the UN{CTS wave w from which the data have been obtained.
Finally, Dt and Dc are respectively year and country indicators to account for unobserved
time and country{speci¯c e®ects. The error term uct is a mean zero error term, which we
assume to be uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. We allow for serial correlation
within country over time and cluster the standard errors at the country level.
We report results from our basic speci¯cation in Table 3, where we use as dependent
variable Amnesty 1, i.e. the indicator of amnesties based on SOPEMI (see section 5.1). In all
speci¯cations we include the vector of control variables X, year and country dummies, while
we gradually add our regressors of interest. We standardize all the continuous variables, with
17To see this point, consider a simple discrete example with two ¯rms, 1 and 2, and focus on an individual
of skill level j = 2. Abstracting from the other channels considered in the model and focusing only on
the labor market, the gain in aggregate income from a legalization at time t can be expressed as gaint =
v(2;2)p22 + v(2;1)p21 ¡ v(2;2)¼22 ¡ v(2;1)¼21, where p22 and ¼22 are respectively the probability of a good
match for legal and illegal workers, and p22 > ¼22. Furthermore, p21 = 1 ¡ p22 and ¼21 = 1 ¡ ¼22 are the
probabilities of a bad match for legal and illegal workers. Consider now the gain in aggregate income from





we assume that p21
t+1 = ®p21 with ® > 1 and that ¼21
t+1 = ¯¼21 with ¯ > 1. ®;¯ > 1 imply a positive
correlation in the mismatch indeces between the two sectors. Consider now the e®ect of changes in the
mismatch indeces on the change in the gain from legalization from t to t + 1. This is given by ¢gain =
gaint+1¡gaint = (v21¡v22)(®p21¡p21¡¯¼21+¼21), where v21¡v22 < 0. If (®p21¡p21¡¯¼21+¼21) < 0;
an increase in the mismatch indeces determines an increase in the gain from legalization, i.e. ¢gain > 0.





®¡1: If ¯ ¸ ®, that is if the
change in the mismatch index for the informal than for the formal sector, ¢gain > 0: On the other hand, if
¯ < ®, ¢gain R 0.
25the exception of the per capita GDP growth rate, by the within-country standard deviation.
Each coe±cient can thus be interpreted as the percentage points increase in the probability
of having an amnesty brought about by a one standard deviation increase in the regressor.
In column (1) we start with a parsimonious speci¯cation, that includes only the mismatch
index based on deviations from the mode. We ¯nd that there exists a strongly positive
and statistically signi¯cant relationship between the value of the mismatch index and the
probability of having an amnesty, which is compatible with the idea that an increase in
the mismatch index for the formal labor market is smaller than the increase in the same
indicator for the informal labor market. In terms of the magnitude of the e®ect, an increase
by one standard deviation in the share of workers that are imperfectly matched to their
job increases the probability of an amnesty by 2.5 percentage points or approximately by
about one ninth of the standard deviation. Among our controls, only the number of asylum
applications has a signi¯cant e®ect. As it turns out, an increase in this variable is associated
with a decrease in the likelihood of an amnesty. This is consistent with the view that {
if asylum seekers are perceived to be likely to become illegals { receiving countries try to
reduce their own attractiveness towards them by carrying out fewer amnesties. In column
(2) we also include a dummy variable to control for whether our mismatch index has been
constructed using the EULFS or national labor force surveys, and we retain it throughout the
remainder of the table. The sign and signi¯cance of our results are una®ected. In column (3)
we account also for the extent of redistribution carried out by the welfare state by including
public spending on unemployment as a share of GDP. As suggested by our theoretical model,
a higher level of spending is negatively and signi¯cantly correlated with the probability of
an amnesty. An increase by one standard deviation in the level of this variable decreases
the probability of a legalization by 2.2 percentage points, without a®ecting the sign and
signi¯cance of the other drivers included in the model. In column (4) we introduce also our
preferred measure of the incidence of criminal activities, namely the number of robberies
per 100 thousand inhabitants, which however does not have a signi¯cant impact. Finally,
in column (5) we add controls for the source of our data on crime, by including dummy
variables for the di®erent waves of the UN{CTS. We will use the speci¯cation in column (5)
as our benchmark when carrying out our extensive series of robustness checks. Notice that
our results in Table 3 are remarkably robust across speci¯cations.
Much of our e®orts have been devoted to the collection of a comprehensive dataset on
general immigration amnesties. As we have mentioned in section 5.1, two main sources have
been used, i.e. the SOPEMI reports and the Regine project output. The overlap between
26the two sources is substantial, yet not complete, as shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
Furthermore, there are a few instances for which we do not have enough information to
determine whether the legalization program satis¯es the de¯nition introduced in section ??.
We assess the robustness of our analysis by experimenting with di®erent de¯nitions of our
dependent variable. Table 4 reports our results. As we can see, even if the number of
legalization episodes considered changes, our results are remarkably robust. Neither the sign
nor the signi¯cance of our proxies for the labor market channel, the welfare state channel or
the criminality channel are a®ected.
We are also concerned that some of our results might be driven by the choice of our key
explanatory variables. To assess the robustness of our ¯ndings, in Table 5 we experiment with
alternative de¯nitions of the mismatch index, our measure of the welfare state generosity
and of the incidence of criminal activities. For comparison purposes, column (1) reports our
benchmark speci¯cation, i.e. column (5) of Table 3. In column (2) we use the mismatch index
based on the median value of education within occupations. Results with this alternative
index are virtually identical to the benchmark. In column (3) and (4) we instead use a
more comprehensive measure of the extent of redistribution by adding to the expenditures
on unemployment bene¯ts public spending on family in column (3) and public spending on
family and housing in column (4). In the latter case, our estimates are based on a lower
number of observations as we have no data on public expenditure for housing in the US in
any year, and in Belgium until 1999. Changing the measure of public expenditure has no
e®ect on our estimates, even when they are based on fewer observations. Finally, we check
the robustness of our results to the choice of di®erent measures of the incidence of criminal
activities: intentional homicides (column 5), thefts (column 6) and rapes (column 7). Also
in this case, our results are not a®ected.
Our data include 17 countries over a period of 28 years. We are worried that some of our
¯ndings might be driven by a particular country. For this reason in Table 6 we replicate the
estimates from our basic speci¯cation (column (5) of Table 3) excluding one country at a
time from our sample. Our results are qualitatively una®ected, with the estimated coe±cient
on the mismatch index ranging between 0.22 and 0.3, the coe±cient on the generosity of the
welfare state ranging between -0.18 and -0.25, and no signi¯cant e®ect of crime.
Some of the countries in our sample have never implemented an immigration amnesty
over the period we study them. We are therefore concerned that by including them we
might bias our parameter estimates. This is because in these countries changes in our
explanatory variables might not carry any useful information on the likelihood of an amnesty.
27In Table 7, we therefore replicate our benchmark speci¯cation using the four de¯nitions of
amnesties described above, but restricting the sample to those countries that implemented
at least one legalization over the sample period. Although the number of observations
shrinks dramatically, especially for Amnesty 1 and Amnesty 3, our parameter estimates
in all speci¯cations, have the expected sign and are larger in magnitude relative to those
obtained with the full sample, even though they are less precisely estimated.18
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have developed a model of legal and illegal immigration, which has helped
us understanding the basic tradeo®s faced by a government between a costly enforcement
of the o±cial immigration target and a lax enforcement ex{ante, combined with an ex{post
legalization program. We have started by analyzing under which conditions an amnesty is
preferable to tolerating undocumented immigrants. Next, we have considered when it is de-
sirable to have ex{ante lax enforcement, rather than carrying out costly enforcement, and we
have shown that three channels play an important role in this decision. An amnesty is more
likely the larger are the output gains brought about by the legalization, the less redistribu-
tive is the welfare state and the higher is the expected cost of the criminal activities carried
out by undocumented immigrants. Importantly, we have shown that, when an amnesty is
desirable from the point of view of the destination country, the latter could have reached an
even higher welfare level by investing in enforcement ex{ante. On the other hand, when an
amnesty is not desirable, the destination country might be better o® by not devoting any
resource to policy enforcement, and by letting some foreign workers enter and stay illegally.
We have then assessed the relevance of the channels identi¯ed by our theoretical model by
constructing a novel panel dataset covering a large group of OECD countries over the period
1980-2007 to study the determinants of the introduction of immigration amnesties. We have
found broad support for both the role played by the labor market matching and the welfare
state channels, obtaining results that are robust to a variety of alternative speci¯cations.
We can think of several avenues along which our analysis could be extended. First, in our
model the government acts as a pure welfare maximizer. We made this assumption to keep
the analysis tractable, but a more realistic setting would involve taking explicitly into account
political economy forces that do play an important role in shaping immigration policy and
18It should also be noted that we have only six countries in the sample for Amnesty 3, and seven countries
for Amnesty 1. With such a small number of countries, cluster-robust standard errors are not very reliable.
Standard errors should therefore be interpreted with due caution.
28its enforcement (see Facchini and Testa 2010). While we have highlighted the e®ect that
an increase in the probability of an amnesty has on the incentives to migrate illegally, a
more comprehensive analysis of the dynamic implications of immigration amnesties could be
developed.19On the one hand, this would allow us to explore issues related to the credibility
of migration policy, and on the other it would enable us to take into account the long run
e®ects of legalization programs on the descendants of current immigrants. While both these
extensions are important, they are left for further research.
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31Appendix
We provide here details on the data source and construction of each of the variables used
in our analysis.
A Labor Market Data
We construct indicators of labor market mismatch using annual country-speci¯c micro-
data. For European countries from year 1998 onwards we use the European Union Labor
Force Survey (EULFS), which provides a homogeneous source of information. The EULFS
does not contain information on educational quali¯cations in any country before 1998, so
we have to rely on country-speci¯c microdata for earlier years, where available. Here we
describe the data used for each country, and the occupational and educational classi¯cation
adopted in each of them.
Austria: Dataset: Microcensus; Years: 1980 { 1997; Occupational Classi¯cation: 1980-
1983: OeBS (Oesterreichische Berufssystematik), 2{digit (84 categories); 1984{1993: OeBS
3{digit available in dataset; 1994-1997: ISCO88, 2{digit; Education: National quali¯cations.
No o±cial crosswalk available between OeBS and ISCO88 2 digit. We use our best judge-
ment to group OeBS 2{digit categories into 27 macro{categories for years 1980{1993. We
transform the national educational classi¯cation into years of education based on Eurostat
conversion tables provided by Statistics Austria.
Belgium: Dataset: Aggregate tables on education by occupation based on Belgian LFS,
provided by Statistics Belgium. Years: 1986 { 1997; Occupational Classi¯cation: 1986{1992:
INS (Institut National Statistiques) rev. 1981 2{digit ; 1993{1996: INS rev. 1991 2{digit ;
1997: ISCO88, 2{digit; Education: National quali¯cations.
We transform INS codes into ISCO88 2{digit and educational classi¯cations into years
of education based on crosswalks provided by Statistics Belgium.
Canada: Dataset: Canadian Labour Force Survey; Years: 1980 { 2007; Occupational Clas-
si¯cation: 1980{1986: SOC (Standard occupational classi¯cation) rev. 1980, 2{digit (21
categories); 1987{2007: NOC-S (National Occupational Classi¯cation{ Statistics) rev. 2001,
2{digit (25 categories); Education: National quali¯cations.
We transform national quali¯cations into years of education using the table available at:
www:uis:unesco:org=Education=ISCEDMappings=
France: Dataset: French Labour Force Survey; Years: 1980 { 1997; Occupational Classi-
32¯cation: 1980{1981: CPS (Cat¶ egories socioprofessionnelles), 2{digit; 1982{1997: ISCO88,
CPS 4{digit. Education: National quali¯cations.
No crosswalk between CPS 2{digit and ISCO88 2{digit: we use original occupational
classi¯cation for years 1980-1981. For years 1982 onwards we use the crosswalk provided
by Jacobs, Michon, and Tijdens (2007). We transform national quali¯cations into years of
education using the table available at: www:uis:unesco:org=Education=ISCEDMappings=
Germany: Dataset: IAB employment sample (IABS); Years: 1980 { 2001; Occupational
Classi¯cation: KldB (Klassi¯zierung der Berufe) rev. 1988, Education: National quali¯ca-
tions.
We group occupation into 20 categories.
Italy: Datasets: Bank of Italy's Household Budget Survey (Indagine sui Bilanci delle
Famiglie { IBF) for years 1980{1991 (no data available for the years 1985, 1988 and 1990);
Italian Labor Force Survey (ILFS) for the years 1992{1997; Occupational Classi¯cation:
1977{1990: IBF professional classi¯cation (Ripartizione per condizione professionale), 1{
digit (7 categories); 1991: IBF new professional classi¯cation, 1{digit (7 di®erent categories);
1992-1997: CP1991 (1991 professional classi¯cation { Classi¯cazione delle Professioni 1991),
2{digit; Education: National quali¯cations for years 1980{1991; years of education and na-
tional quali¯cations for years 1992{1997.
We use original occupational classi¯cations for years 1980{1991. For years 1992 onwards
we convert CP1991 into 2{digit ISCO88 based on the tables available at: www:ilo:org and
www3:istat:it. For the years 1980{1991 we transform national quali¯cations into years of
education based on the conversion adopted in the ILFS for years 1992{1997.
Netherlands: Dataset: Dutch Labour Force Survey; Years: 1990 { 1997; Occupational
Classi¯cation: 1991{1992: CBS-Beroepenclassi¯catie rev. 1984, 1{digit; 1990 and 1993{
1997: CBS-Beroepenclassi¯catie 1992, 1{digit; Education: National quali¯cations.
We use original occupational classi¯cation at 1{digit, as there is no mapping between
CPS and ISCO88. We transform national quali¯cations into years of education based on
country experts' advice.
Norway: Dataset: Norwegian Labor Force Survey; Years: 1980 { 1999 and 2005; Oc-
cupational Classi¯cation: 1980{1995: NYK (Nordic Classi¯cation of Occupation), 1{digit;
1996{2009: NOC (Norwegian Classi¯cation of Occupation), 4{digit; Education: National
quali¯cations.
We use original 1{digit occupational classi¯cation for years 1980{1995. From year 1996 we
use 2{digit NOC, which closely follows 2{digit ISCO88. We transform national quali¯cations
33in years of education using a crosswalk provided by the Norwegian Statistical Institute and
the table available at: www:uis:unesco:org=Education=. Note that in 1991 the variable
indicating interviewees' occupation is not provided, hence, it is not possible to compute the
mismatch index for that year.
Spain: Dataset: Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de Poblacion Activa, EPA); Years:
1983 { 1997; Occupational Classi¯cation: 1992{Q1 1994: CNO (National Occupational Clas-
si¯cation) rev. 1979, 3{digit; Q2 1994 {1997: CNO (National Occupational Classi¯cation)
rev. 1994, 3{digit; Education: National quali¯cations.
We transform CNO rev. 1979 into CNO rev. 1994 in all years. We then transform CNO
rev. 1994 into ISCO88 2{digit. Conversions are based on tables provided by the National
Statistics Institute at: www:ine:es=. We transform national quali¯cations into years of
education based on country experts' advice.
Switzerland: Dataset: Swiss Labor Force Survey; Years: 1991 { 2007; Occupational Clas-
si¯cation: ISCO88 2{digit; Education: 1991{2000: National quali¯cations; 2001{2007:
ISCED (International Standard Classi¯cation of Education) rev. 1997. We transform
national quali¯cations and ISCED categories into years of education based on the infor-
mation available at: www:swissworld:org=en=education=compulsory schooling=overview=
and www:uis:unesco:org=Education=ISCEDMappings=.
UK: Dataset: UK Labor Force Survey; Years: 1984{1997; Occupational Classi¯cation:
years 1984{1990: KODOT; years 1991-1997 SOC (Standard Occupational Classi¯cation)
rev. 1990; Education: age at which individuals left full time education.
We transform KODOT into SOC rev. 1990 using conversion tables provided by the O±ce
of National Statistics Classi¯cations and Harmonisation Unit. We then group 2{digit SOC
rev. 1990 categories into sub{major occupation groups based on the SOC90 structure. We
obtain years of education from the variable \Age at which left full time education", assuming
for everyone a school starting age of 5.
USA: Dataset: IPUMS-Current Population Survey (CPS); Years: 1980{2007; Occupational
Classi¯cation: 1990 Occupation codes, 21 macrocategories; Education: National quali¯ca-
tions.
We have no country-speci¯c microdata for Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Swe-
den. For these countries, we therefore only use years 1998 onwards, based on the EULFS.
34B Crime Data
Our main source of information on crime are the United Nations Surveys on Crime Trends
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (UN{CTS). In particular, we use wave 2 and
3, covering years 1975 { 1986, wave 4, covering years 1986 { 1990, wave 5, covering years 1990
{ 1994, wave 6, covering years 1995 { 1997, wave 8, covering years 2001 { 2002, wave 9 2003
{ 2004, wave 10, covering years 2005 { 2006, and wave 11, covering years 2007 { 2008. The
UN{CTS is a survey conducted by the United Nations O±ce on Drugs and Crime on crime
levels and criminal justice trends in member states. Information from participating countries
is collected through questionnaires sent to one reference person/institution in each country
(the so called \focal point") who is responsible for coordinating the country's responses.
Frequency and homogeneity of data collection has improved in recent years. Data are now
collected annually, and series from 2003 onwards are homogeneous. We account for potential
discontinuities in the crime series in our empirical analysis with dummy variables to indicate
the wave from which the data are obtained.
Some years are covered in two di®erent waves of the UN-CTS: 1986 is covered in both
wave 3 and wave 4 and 1990 is covered in both wave 4 and wave 5. In these cases we keep
data from the earlier wave available for each country. For instance, if a country reports the
number of crimes in 1986 both in wave 3 and in wave 4, we keep information from wave
3 only; if a country does not report data wave 3 but does report it in the wave 4, we use
the latter. We use data on police reported crime for robberies, intentional homicides, thefts
and rapes. We do not have data for each of these crimes in all countries in every year. We
use robberies as the main crime indicator because it is the series with the fewest missing
values, and we replace missing observations with linearly interpolated values, in an e®ort to
maximize the number of data points available in the regression analysis. In our robustness
checks, we also use data on intentional homicides, thefts and rapes, where we both interpolate
and extrapolate missing values, to keep the sample size constant.
The UN{CTS does not report crime data for the UK as a whole in all years. Instead, it
reports consistently data for England and Wales, with the exception of years 2001 and 2002
(UN{CTS wave 8) where we only have aggregate UK data. We therefore use crime rates for
England and Wales as a proxy for crime rates in the entire UK with the exception of years
2001 and 2002.
Our ¯nal variables express crime as rates per 100 thousand individuals. To construct
these ¯gures, we use data on the size of a country's population from the United Nations,
35Department of Economic and Social A®airs, World Population Prospects, 2010 Revision.
We have also checked the reliability of our measures of crime from the UN{CTS, with
¯gures from the European Sourcebook on Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics (ESCCJS),
a data collection initiative that started in 1993 under the umbrella of the Council of Europe.
This source covers European countries only, over the period 1990-2007: data from this
independent data source match closely those from the UN-CTS. Based on a comparison
with information from the ESCCJS, we have concluded that in the UN{CTS robbery rates
for Belgium starting from 2003, and for Spain before 1990 and after 1997 are one order of
magnitude too big, and in Belgium in 1994 one order of magnitude too small. We have
manually corrected this recording mistakes. All our results are robust to the use of the
unadjusted original ¯gures.
36Country Year Stock





USA 2008 12000 32.4 2008 500 2
Austria 2003 100 10.8 2001 50 1
Italy 2008 650 22.1 2001 100 5
Germany 2005 500 7.4 2001 90 0
Greece 2007 250 43.8 2001 80 2
Spain 2008 570 10.9 2001 40 6
UK 2007 725 11.1 2001 95 0
Table 1. Illegal immigrants in thousands and number of amnesties
The table reports for each country the estimated stock of undocumented immigrants in the corresponding year,
expressed in thousands and as a percentage of the foreign population. It also reports the estimated inflow of
undocumented migrants (in thousands) in selected years. The last column reports the number of immigration
amnesties adopted by each country over the period 1980-2007.





Amnesty 1 Amnesty 2 Amnesty 3 Amnesty 4
Austria 1980 2006 1990 1990 1990 1990
Belgium 1986 2007 0 0 0 0
Canada 1980 2007 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 1991 2007 0 0 0 0
Germany 1980 2007 0 0 0 0














Greece 1998 2007 2001, 2005 2001, 2005 2001, 2005 2001, 2005















Netherlands 1990 2006 0 1991 0 1991
Norway 1980 2007 0 0 0 0
Portugal 1998 2007 2001 2001 0 0
Sweden 1998 2007 0 0 0 0
UK 1984 2007 0 2003 0 2003
USA 1980 2007 1986, 2000 1986, 2000 1986 1986
Total 19 24 17 21
The table reports, for each country, the first and the last year in which the country enters the sample. Columns
Amnesty 1 - Amnesty 4 report the years in which each amnesty occurs. The last row reports the total number of
occurrences of each amnesty in our study.
Table 2. Sample years and amnesties by country
Amnesty 1: all amnesties listed in SOPEMI. Amnesty 2: all amnesties listed in REGINE or SOPEMI. Amnesty
3: amnesties listed in SOPEMI, excluding ambiguous cases. Amnesty 4: amnesties listed in REGINE or
SOPEMI excluding the ambiguous cases.1 2 3 4 5
Mismatch index (mode) 0.025** 0.027** 0.029** 0.029** 0.028***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)




Asylum applications -0.022** -0.020** -0.022** -0.022** -0.024**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
GDP per head growth rate 0.234 0.189 0.087 0.117 0.061
(0.469) (0.463) (0.434) (0.433) (0.425)
Old age dependency ratio 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Right-wing government 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.045
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
EULFS No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crime survey dummies No No No No Yes
N 347 347 347 347 347
R-squared 0.11 0.111 0.118 0.118 0.135
The table reports results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating
whether the country had an immigration amnesty in that year. All specifications include country fixed effects
and year dummies. All continuous variables except GDP growth are standardized by their within-country
standard deviation. EULFS is a dummy variable indicating whether the labor market mismatch index is
computed on EULFS data or on national datasets. Crime survey dummies are a series of dummy variables
indicating the UN-CTS wave from which the data have been obtained. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at the country level. 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
Table 3. Main results: Dependent variable Amnesty 1Amnesty 2 Amnesty 3 Amnesty 4
Mismatch index (mode) 0.033*** 0.021** 0.032**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Public spending unemployment -0.026** -0.018** -0.018*
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Robberies 0.006 0.007 0.001
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014)
Asylum applications -0.021** -0.019** -0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP per head growth rate 0.666 0.12 0.76
(0.810) (0.428) (0.842)
Old age dependency ratio -0.002 0.006 -0.002
(0.013) (0.008) (0.012)
Right-wing government 0.061 0.052 0.06
(0.050) (0.031) (0.046)
EULFS Yes Yes Yes
Crime survey Yes Yes Yes
N 347 347 347
R-squared 0.12 0.127 0.123
Dependent variable
The table reports results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the
country had an immigration amnesty in that year. Each column reports results with a different definition of amnesty (see
Table 2 for details). All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. All continuous variables except
GDP growth are standardized by their within-country standard deviation. EULFS is a dummy variable indicating whether
the labor market mismatch index is computed on EULFS data or on national datasets. Crime survey dummies are a series
of dummy variables indicating the UN-CTS wave from which the data have been obtained. Standard errors in parenthesis
are clustered at the country level. 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
Table 4. Robustness check: Alternative definitions of amnesty1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Mismatch index (mode) 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Mismatch index (median) 0.027**
(0.012)
-0.023*** -0.021** -0.022** -0.022** -0.022***





Robberies 0.003 0.004 0.001 -0.001







Asylum applications -0.024** -0.022** -0.022** -0.020* -0.024** -0.024** -0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
GDP per head growth rate 0.061 0.072 0.01 0.006 0.029 0.012 0.06
(0.425) (0.428) (0.389) (0.540) (0.449) (0.504) (0.468)
Old age dependency ratio 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Right-wing government 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.051 0.045 0.045 0.046
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.031)
EU LFS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crime survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 347 347 347 305 347 347 347
R-squared 0.135 0.135 0.134 0.141 0.135 0.135 0.136
The table reports results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the country had an
immigration amnesty in that year. Amnesty definition: Amnesty 1. All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies.
All continuous variables except GDP growth are standardized by their within-country standard deviation. EULFS is a dummy variable
indicating whether the labor market mismatch index is computed on EULFS data or on national datasets. Crime survey dummies are a
series of dummy variables indicating the UN-CTS wave from which the data have been obtained. Standard errors in parenthesis are
clustered at the country level.
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
Public spending unemployment, 
family and housing
Public spending unemployment 
and family
Table 5.  Robustness check: Alternative definitions of main regressors. 
Public spending unemploymentAustria Belgium Canada Switzerland Germany Denmark Spain France Greece Ireland Italy Netherlands Norway Portugal Sweden UK USA
0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.022** 0.032*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.023** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.027***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
-0.019** -0.023** -0.023** -0.025*** -0.025** -0.024*** -0.023** -0.019** -0.022** -0.024*** -0.018** -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.019** -0.024** -0.023** -0.023**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Robberies 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.006 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014)
-0.027** -0.024** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.024** -0.022** -0.019 -0.027** -0.023** -0.018* -0.028*** -0.025** -0.025** -0.023** -0.024** -0.019*
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
-0.102 0.025 -0.032 0.063 0.183 0.073 0.201 0.168 0.185 0.15 -0.053 0.041 0.213 -0.153 0.045 0.008 0.056
(0.424) (0.461) (0.499) (0.442) (0.511) (0.418) (0.485) (0.440) (0.420) (0.439) (0.491) (0.456) (0.457) (0.424) (0.427) (0.495) (0.514)
0.002 0.002 0 0.003 0.001 0.002 0 -0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.006 0 0.005 0.004
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
0.057* 0.045 0.05 0.044 0.047 0.046 0.04 0.016 0.039 0.046 0.031 0.045 0.058 0.049 0.045 0.052 0.053
(0.032) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.038) (0.025) (0.032) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.034)
EULFS Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crime survey Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 320 325 319 330 319 337 322 319 337 339 320 330 319 337 337 323 319
R-squared 0.152 0.143 0.145 0.139 0.146 0.136 0.143 0.157 0.135 0.139 0.141 0.14 0.149 0.132 0.137 0.144 0.137
Table 6. Robustness check: Excluding one country at a time
The table reports results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the country had an immigration amnesty in that year. All specifications include country fixed effects and year dummies. All
continuous variables except GDP growth are standardized by their within-country standard deviation. EULFS is a dummy variable indicating whether the labor market mismatch index is computed on EULFS data or on national datasets. Crime survey
dummies are a series of dummy variables indicating the UN-CTS wave from which the data have been obtained. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country level. 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.












(mode)Amnesty 1 Amnesty 2 Amnesty 3 Amnesty 4
Mismatch index (mode) 0.033* 0.038*** 0.025 0.040**
(0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.014)
Public spending unemployment -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.044*** -0.051**
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.019)
Robberies 0.032 0.029 0.018 0.01
(0.028) (0.023) (0.042) (0.034)
Asylum applications -0.031* -0.018 -0.032 -0.015
(0.015) (0.012) (0.026) (0.017)
GDP per head growth rate -0.039 1.381 -0.142 1.555
(0.963) (1.618) (1.261) (1.515)
Old age dependency ratio 0.015 -0.031 0.011 -0.037
(0.034) (0.045) (0.049) (0.045)
Right-wing government 0.111 0.115 0.154* 0.118
(0.077) (0.075) (0.065) (0.068)
EULFS Yes Yes Yes Yes
Crime survey Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 155 196 145 186
R-squared 0.284 0.201 0.279 0.209
Table 7. Robustness check: Excluding countries which never had an amnesty
The table reports results from linear probability models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating
whether the country had an immigration amnesty in that year. Each column reports results with a different
definition of amnesty (see Table 2 for details). All specifications include country fixed effects and year
dummies. All continuous variables except GDP growth are standardized by their within-country standard
deviation. EULFS is a dummy variable indicating whether the labor market mismatch index is computed on
EULFS data or on national datasets. Crime survey dummies are a series of dummy variables indicating the UN-
CTS wave from which the data have been obtained. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the country
level. 
* denotes significance at 10%, ** denotes significance at 5%, *** denotes significance at 1%.
The sample is restricted to countries that have had at least one amnesty during the observation period.Country Year SOPEMI REGINE Ambigous Details on amnesty
Austria 1990 Yes Yes No Sanierungsaktion: aimed at legalizing irregular employment,
especially with regard to asylum seekers.
1980 No Yes No Administrative regularization
1981 Yes Yes No Administrative regularization; open to anyone with stable labour
markey integration, stable family relations, or de facto refugees.
1997 Yes Yes No Administrative regularization started in June 1997 and terminated
in May 1998, aimed at rejected asylum seekers and de facto
refugees, partners and families, long-term present immigrants.
These categories were trapped in irregular situations by the
"Pasqua Law", yet protected from expulsion by law.
2001 Yes Yes No Law 2910/ 2001; open to holders of expired residence permits and
to anyone who had resided, legally or illegally, in Greece for one
year immediately prior to the entry into force of the 2001 law.
2005 Yes Yes No Immigration Law 3386/2005; open to migrants who had lost their
legal status because of the expiry of their residence permit before
August 23, 2005 and who did not have it renewed, and to migrants
who had never resided in the country legally, provided they could
prove their presence in Greece before January 1, 2005.
1982 No Yes No Administrative regularization, promoted by the Ministry for Labor
Memoranda dated 17.12.1979, 08.03.1980, 02.03.1982,
09.09.1982; open to anyone with two months of continuous
residence in Italy over the preceding two months, and with an
employment offer.
1986 Yes No No Legislative regularization (Law no. 943 of 1986), passed in 1986,
originally meant to last 3 months but then extended three times.
Program covered the period January 27, 1987 - September 30,
1988; open to anyone in Italy as of the end of April 1987.
1990 Yes Yes No Legislative regularization (Law no. 39 of 1990, so-called
“Martelli”), open to anyone who was present in Italy on December
1, 1990.
1995 Yes Yes No Legislative regularization (Law Decree no. 489 of 1995). Open to
anyone in the country at the date the bill came into force who
either had a job for the last six months, or had legally resident
family members.
1998 Yes Yes No Regularization programme (Prime Minister Decree 16.10.1998 and
Leg. Decree 113/1999) approved together with the immigration
reform introduced by Law no. 40 of 1998 (so-called “Turco-
Napolitano” law). Open to anyone who was in the country, and
employed, at the time the amnesty was introduced.
2002 Yes Yes No Legislative regularization which came into force on September 9,
2002, that is 15 days after the publication of the new immigration
law (Law no. 189 of 30 July 2002, also known as the “Bossi-Fini”
law and law 222/2002). Initially targeted to housekeepers and
domestic care workers, then extended to any worker who had been
in continuous employment for at least three months prior to the
introduction of the amnesty. 
2006 No Yes Yes “De facto”, ex-post regularization programme: March 2006 law
decree on migration flows enforced by the Berlusconi Cabinet;
April 2006 the new Italian centre-left government elected in April
immediately announced the adoption of a second decree providing
for a number of “entriy permits” roughly equivalent to the number
of unsuccessful applications in the framework of the previous
decree on flows.




Table continues on next pageCountry Year SOPEMI REGINE Ambigous Details on amnesty
Netherlands 1991 No Yes No Regularization program open to anyone who could prove lengthy
stay and work in the Netherlands, including payment of taxes and
social benefits.
Portugal 2001 Yes Yes Yes Art. 55 Decree 4/2001, regularization programme ran from
January until November 2001, targeted to immigrants already
working in the country.
1985 Yes Yes No Open to anyone resident and employed in Spain as of July 24,
1985.
1991 Yes Yes No Program running from June to December, open to immigrants with
expired residence permits, who had worked in the previous two
years for at least 9 months, with employment contract or self
employed.
1996 Yes Yes No Regularization programme under the New Aliens Act of September
1996. Open to irregular workers and relatives.
2000 Yes Yes No Organic Law 4/2000 of 11th January, Royal Decree 239/2000 of
18th of February, program ran from March to July 2000. Open to
irregular workers, irregular residents, relatives, and rejected asylum
seekers.
2001 Yes Yes No Royal Decree 142/2001 of 16 February, open to foreigner present
in Spain before January 23 , 2001, integrated in the labor market or
with family ties in Spain.
2004 Yes Yes No Royal Decree 2393/2004 of 30 December, open to irregular
workers with employment contract for at least six months.
UK 2003 No Yes No Family indefinite leave to remain exercise, open to certain asylum-
seeking families who have been in the UK for at least four years.
1986 Yes Yes No Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), open to anyone
continuosly resident since 1982, and some categories of seasonal
agricultural workers.
2000 Yes Yes Yes Legal Immigration and Family Equity Act (LIFEA), enabling
almost 400 thousand undocumented migrants to apply for
regularisation provided they entered the US before 1992.
USA
For each country we report the year in which amnesties occurred, based on SOPEMI and/or REGINE. Column SOPEMI indicates whether the
amnesty is listed in SOPEMI. Column REGINE indicates whether the amnesty is listed in REGINE. Column Ambigous indicates whether there are
doubts as to whether the amnesty satisfies the criteria to be included in our analysis. 
Spainmean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
Austria 0.04 0.19 0.25 0.04 28.82 13.20 0.99 0.23 2.06 1.28 0.02 0.01 22.55 0.89 0.26 0.45
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.04 121.60 46.70 3.08 0.20 1.63 0.91 0.02 0.01 24.18 1.90 1.00 0.00
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.03 98.58 8.85 1.35 0.58 0.86 0.41 0.02 0.02 16.96 1.72 0.39 0.50
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.07 38.88 10.86 0.89 0.31 3.13 1.60 0.01 0.02 22.47 0.77 0.29 0.47
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.05 57.30 17.74 1.30 0.38 1.38 1.20 0.02 0.01 23.53 2.62 0.64 0.49
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.02 55.19 4.27 2.91 0.48 1.05 0.70 0.02 0.01 22.57 0.44 0.60 0.52
Spain 0.24 0.44 0.33 0.05 133.12 38.26 2.63 0.72 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.01 22.17 2.37 0.32 0.48
France 0.07 0.26 0.35 0.07 111.53 50.08 1.44 0.72 0.59 0.23 0.02 0.01 22.68 2.03 0.46 0.51
Greece 0.20 0.42 0.35 0.01 18.75 5.37 0.40 0.03 0.70 0.61 0.04 0.01 25.97 1.35 0.30 0.48
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.03 52.06 9.15 0.88 0.11 1.97 0.82 0.04 0.02 16.43 0.29 0.00 0.00
Italy 0.19 0.40 0.39 0.04 57.70 23.48 0.75 0.30 0.14 0.14 0.02 0.01 23.84 3.55 0.26 0.45
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.05 102.37 17.08 2.04 0.64 1.78 0.84 0.02 0.01 19.71 0.75 0.53 0.51
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.41 0.09 23.41 9.14 0.66 0.34 1.31 1.12 0.02 0.02 23.97 0.99 0.50 0.51
Portugal 0.10 0.32 0.32 0.06 173.07 23.65 0.89 0.23 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 24.64 0.89 0.30 0.48
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.20 93.86 6.90 1.23 0.33 2.56 0.94 0.03 0.01 26.61 0.22 0.10 0.32
UK 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.10 126.47 52.98 0.83 0.59 0.59 0.41 0.02 0.01 24.05 0.47 0.58 0.50
USA 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.01 201.17 45.65 0.45 0.17 0.22 0.15 0.02 0.02 18.49 0.64 0.64 0.49







The table reports mean and standard deviation of all the variables used in our main regressions of Table 3.
See Table 2 for the definition of Amnesty 1. Mismatch index (mode)is the proportion of workers with a number of yers of schooling at least one standard deviation above or below the mode of years of
schooling in their occupation, measured at the sub-major occupation group level (ISCO88 2-digit or equivalent). Robberies per 100k individuals is the ratio of police-reported robberies (from UN-CTS) to
the country population, expressed in hundreds of thousands. Public spend unemployment as a % of GDP is the public expenditure on unemployment benefits as a share of GDP, from the OECD Social
Expenditure Database. Asylum applications per 1000 population is the ratio of the number of applications for asylum in every year (from the UNHCR Statistical Database) to the country population,
expressed in thousands. GDP per head growth rate is the growth rate of the GDP per head, expressed at constant prices and exchange rate, constructed from the OECD National Accounts. Old age
dependency ratio is the ratio of people older than 64 to the working age (16-64) population, from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. Right-wing party in government is a dummy
variable indicating whether the main party in the government's coalition is right-wing, constructed from the 2010 edition of the World Bank's Database of Political Institutions (DPI).












 GDP per head 
growth ratemean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev. mean st. dev.
Austria 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.23 0.03 1.44 0.65 1894.68 267.77 8.37 2.25 3.83 0.30 3.93 0.28
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.04 1.89 0.47 2591.97 574.10 16.09 8.81 5.55 0.31 5.84 0.20
Canada 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.03 2.62 1.39 3373.66 1159.87 64.39 41.57 2.16 0.46 2.76 0.54
Switzerland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.07 1.31 0.56 2297.89 526.42 6.13 1.58 2.14 0.33 2.28 0.33
Germany 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.05 2.24 1.12 3586.27 580.57 8.32 1.35 3.21 0.59 3.49 0.69
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.02 0.92 0.20 3358.61 179.21 9.13 0.65 6.29 0.52 6.97 0.53
Spain 0.24 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.24 0.44 0.30 0.05 1.29 0.47 964.19 482.44 6.80 4.00 3.23 0.66 3.37 0.67
France 0.11 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.34 0.08 2.71 1.21 2407.48 1645.54 10.48 4.67 4.22 0.75 5.00 0.85
Greece 0.20 0.42 0.20 0.42 0.20 0.42 0.35 0.03 1.08 0.26 516.66 136.50 1.89 0.41 1.47 0.06 2.04 0.05
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 0.05 1.17 0.27 1129.90 214.37 8.95 2.36 3.15 0.33 3.51 0.33
Italy 0.26 0.45 0.19 0.40 0.22 0.42 0.38 0.04 2.71 1.56 2055.98 487.88 2.78 1.87 1.69 0.35 1.70 0.35
Netherlands 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.24 0.39 0.04 3.75 4.41 4264.60 591.32 9.82 0.92 3.56 0.57 3.93 0.56
Norway 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.10 1.18 0.53 3530.26 671.64 9.71 4.66 3.45 0.87 3.64 0.85
Portugal 0.10 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.06 1.96 0.70 965.55 221.45 3.57 0.38 2.02 0.36 2.02 0.36
Sweden 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.21 1.50 0.53 5553.20 1323.10 27.97 9.91 4.45 0.32 5.04 0.39
UK 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.31 0.09 1.57 0.13 4225.74 834.24 13.34 8.01 3.32 0.44 4.73 0.43
USA 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 0.27 0.01 7.25 1.57 3500.22 1029.84 35.53 3.49 1.08 0.21                
Total 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.33 0.08 2.37 2.09 2803.74 1403.19 15.88 20.79 3.15 1.36 3.63 1.35









and family as a 
% of GDP
The table reports mean and standard deviation of variables used in the robustness checks, overall and by country.
See Table 2 for the definition of Amnesty 3 - Amnesty 4. Mismatch index (median) is the proportion of workers with a number of yers of schooling at least one standard deviation above or below the median
years of schooling in their occupation, measured at the sub-major occupation group level (ISCO88 2-digit or equivalent). Homicides per 100k individuals is the ratio of police-reported intentional homicides
(from UN-CTS) to the country population, expressed in hundreds of thousands. Thefts per 100k individuals is the ratio of police-reported thefts (from UN-CTS) to the country population, expressed in hundreds
of thousands. Rapes per 100k individuals is the ratio of police-reported rapes (from UN-CTS) to the country population, expressed in hundreds of thousands. Public spending unemployment and family as a % of
GDP is the public expenditure on unemployment and family benefits as a share of GDP, from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Public spending unemployment, family and housing as a % of GDP is the
public expenditure on unemployment, family and housing benefits as a share of GDP, from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. 
Table A2 (cont.). Summary statistics for variables used in the robustness checks







Thefts per 100k 
individuals